The efficiency question in economics by Northcott, Robert
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Northcott, Robert (2018) The efficiency question in economics. Philosophy
of Science 85 (5), pp. 1140-1151. ISSN 0031-8248.
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/20999/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
1 
 
Title page 
 
Title: “The Efficiency Question in Economics” 
 
Abstract 
Much philosophical attention has been devoted to whether economic models explain, and 
more generally to how scientific models represent. Yet there is an issue more practically 
important to economics than either of these, which I label the efficiency question: regardless 
of how exactly models represent, or of whether their role is explanatory or something else, is 
current modeling practice an efficient way to achieve these goals – or should research efforts 
be redirected? In addition to showing how the efficiency question has been relatively 
neglected, I give two examples of the kind of analysis it requires. 
 
 
Contact Information: 
Robert Northcott 
r.northcott@bbk.ac.uk 
Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX 
Department office telephone: +44 (0)20 7631 6383 
Department office fax: +44 (0)20 7631 6564 
 
Acknowledgements 
I thank Anna Alexandrova and two anonymous referees for useful feedback. I also thank 
Richard Urwin, my fellow PSA symposiasts Lawrence Boland, Jennifer Jhun and James 
Weatherall, as well as the symposium audience. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
The Efficiency Question in Economics 
 
Abstract 
Much philosophical attention has been devoted to whether economic models explain, and 
more generally to how scientific models represent. Yet there is an issue more practically 
important to economics than either of these, which I label the efficiency question: regardless 
of how exactly models represent, or of whether their role is explanatory or something else, is 
current modeling practice an efficient way to achieve these goals – or should research efforts 
be redirected? In addition to showing how the efficiency question has been relatively 
neglected, I give two examples of the kind of analysis it requires. 
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1. Introduction: The Efficiency Question 
Economic modeling has been criticized for being too idealized, intellectually isolated from 
neighboring fields, and having a poor predictive record.
1
 A particular debate has arisen more 
recently over whether economic models explain, and if so in what sense. In this paper, I urge 
a shift in philosophical focus. The reason is that a different issue is much more pressing. Both 
sides agree that models are sometimes useful and sometimes not. What really matters is: how 
often are they useful? Thus, should economists do more such modeling or should they invest 
their efforts elsewhere? What matters is not whether models can play the explanatory role 
that one side insists they can and the other insists they cannot. Rather, if defenders are right, 
what matters is how well, in fact, models do play their explanatory role. And likewise, if 
critics are right, what matters is how well models play an alternative role. 
 
I label this the efficiency question. To answer it requires, so to speak, an epistemic cost-
benefit analysis. The costs are the resources invested into modeling, such as mathematical 
training of students, and perhaps more notably the opportunity costs, such as fieldwork 
methods not taught and fieldwork not done. The benefits are the successful explanations, 
predictions and interventions that modeling leads to. What is the balance – compared to 
alternatives? 
 
                                                          
1
 Throughout, I will have in mind the orthodox neoclassical models that dominate mainstream 
economic theory, i.e. formal models that deduce the equilibrium outcomes of interactions 
between economically rational agents. But, although there is no space to pursue it here, much 
of what I say will apply also to models from other approaches, such as agent-based 
simulations, econophysics, network analysis, behavioral economics, and even Marxist or 
Austrian economics. It will also apply to models in some other fields too, such as 
mathematical ecology. 
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And what are those alternatives? The answer is any mix of methods other than the current 
one, and in particular mixes that put less emphasis on orthodox theory. Freed of orthodox 
methodological constraints, economics would arguably be able to take advantage of a much 
wider range of empirical methods – generating results that in a virtuous circle could then feed 
back into more theory development, just as they do in many other sciences. These empirical 
methods include: qualitative methods such as interviews and ethnographic observation; 
questionnaires; small-N causal inference, such as qualitative comparative analysis; purely 
predictive models; causal process tracing; causal inference from observational statistics; 
machine learning from big data; historical studies; randomized controlled trials; laboratory 
experiments; and natural and quasi-experiments.
2
 Each of these has its own strengths and 
weaknesses, but each is already widely practiced and has a developed and rigorous 
methodological literature. Turning to them is in no way a return to the fuzzy verbal analysis 
that is the pejorative memory of much pre-war economics. 
 
What is the optimal balance between, on one hand, building up a library of orthodox rational 
choice models, and on the other hand, pursuing more applied, contextual work and utilizing a 
wider range of empirical methods? Current practice is already a mixture of the two, so the 
question becomes – is it the right mixture? Of course, the associated cost-benefit analysis can 
only be done imperfectly and approximately. In reality, it is hard to count up explanations 
and predictions in an objective way, hard to weigh these versus other goals of science, and 
hard also to evaluate the counterfactual of whether a different allocation of resources would 
have done better. But implicitly, efficiency analyses are unavoidable and being done already 
– namely, every time a researcher chooses, or a graduate school teaches, one method rather 
than another, or journals or prizes or hirers choose one paper or candidate rather than 
                                                          
2
 The latter few of these have begun to be co-opted by mainstream economics already. 
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another.
3
 The status quo is not inevitable, as shown by different practices in other social 
sciences – and also within economics by the recent ‘empirical turn’ (section 5 below). So, the 
efficiency question must be faced. And it is surely better to face it explicitly than to leave it to 
inertia and sociological winds. Efficiency analysis is worth our time. Indeed, it is arguably 
the most practically important issue in philosophy of economics. 
 
It might be objected that such efficiency analysis is impossible because orthodox theory and 
the various alternatives are too entangled to be separated. For example, the very hypothesis a 
field trial tests might be derived from theory.
4
 This is true up to a point – but not up to the 
point that the possibility of efficiency analysis can be wished away. This is again best 
demonstrated by examples, which will illustrate both the feasibility and the value of 
efficiency analysis.  
 
What is the best way to do efficiency analysis? In practice, it is via case studies, i.e. the 
details of actual examples, rather than via than some abstract calculus. Moreover, its answers 
are typically not especially sensitive to the exact philosophical account of explanation that we 
happen to endorse. For this very reason, at least for the purpose of efficiency analysis in 
economics, philosophical attention should be diverted away from theories of explanation. 
These claims are again best demonstrated by example, to which I turn in a moment. 
                                                          
3
 Of course, other factors enter such decisions too, such as what best serves one’s own career. 
Nevertheless, an implicit efficiency analysis is certainly one important component. 
4
 It is a truism that all empirical work assumes some ‘theory’ in the form of background 
assumptions. But the issue here is whether these background assumptions must include those 
of orthodox economic theory. This also makes clear why the efficiency question is distinct 
from the separate debate, within philosophy of economics, about the relative merits of 
targeted versus targetless models – for both of these model-types share the same commitment 
to orthodox fundamentals. 
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Two kinds of efficiency analysis are possible. The first is global: does the current overall 
allocation of resources serve economics well compared to a different allocation? This is the 
most challenging to assess because of the vast range of costs and benefits involved. The 
second kind of efficiency analysis is local: given a particular explanandum, what methods 
should be used to tackle it and in what proportion? This is much more tractable and many 
case studies are in part just such analyses already. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section, I present an example of efficiency 
analysis at the local level. Then I explain how the efficiency question has been neglected by 
the philosophy of economics literature, before showing how it has been neglected by the 
wider scientific modeling literature too. At the end, I return to the issue of efficiency analysis 
at the global level. 
 
2. Local Efficiency Analysis: Prisoner’s Dilemma and World War One Truces 
According to JSTOR, almost 22,000 journal articles have appeared about the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma since 1970. A striking aspect of this huge literature is its overwhelmingly 
theoretical focus. Much of it concerns developments of the basic game: versions with 
multiple moves or players, versions with asynchronous moves, iterated versions, evolutionary 
versions, and many other tweaks besides. Research muscle has been bet on theoretical 
development. Empirical applications, by contrast, are conspicuously thin on the ground.
5
  
 
                                                          
5
 A lot of the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature is ‘empirical’ in the sense that it reports on 
psychological experiments, but that does not negate the main point here. 
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It is in fact hard to find serious attempts to apply the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain actual 
historical or contemporary phenomena, as opposed to informal mentions or off-hand remarks. 
I will focus here on one of the few such attempts, namely the well-known analysis by Robert 
Axelrod (1984) of the live-and-let-live system of spontaneous truces in World War One 
(‘WW1’).6 Has the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature’s theoretical focus borne fruit in this case? I 
answer ‘no’, and thus that there is good reason to think that – with respect to this particular 
explanandum – research muscle has been allocated inefficiently.7 
 
Axelrod models the situation in the WW1 trenches as an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. What 
behaviors should we expect? To answer that, Axelrod ran a series of computer tournaments 
from which he inferred that the optimal strategy is Tit-For-Tat with initial co-operation – that 
is, we should expect players initially to co-operate and thereafter to repeat whatever the other 
player did in the previous period.
8
 Axelrod then draws on the fascinating and detailed account 
of WW1 trench warfare by the historian Tony Ashworth (1980), itself based on extensive 
archives, letters, and interviews with veterans. Axelrod’s explicit goal (1984, 71) is to explain 
how informal truces could have arisen spontaneously on the Western front despite constant 
pressure against them from senior commanders. His case is that, upon analysis, the implicit 
pay-offs for each side were those of an indefinitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and that co-
operation – i.e. a truce – is therefore exactly his theory’s prediction. 
                                                          
6
 See (Northcott and Alexandrova 2015) for more details and references about all aspects of 
this case. 
7
 There is also good reason to think the WW1 case is typical in this respect of applications of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma more generally, although that is beside the point for a local efficiency 
analysis. 
8
 Analytically, there are many optimal strategies. One of Axelrod’s innovations was to use 
simulations to narrow these down. It has subsequently been disputed whether Axelrod was 
right that Tit-For-Tat is indeed the optimal strategy, but the text’s main points hold anyway. 
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Many historical details seem to support Axelrod’s case, such as the limited retaliations that 
followed breaches of a truce, or the demonstrations of force capability via harmless means in 
order to establish a threat credibly but non-disruptively. Perhaps the most striking evidence is 
how the live-and-let-live system eventually broke down. The (unwitting) cause of this was a 
policy, dictated by senior command, of frequent raids, i.e. carefully prepared attacks on 
enemy trenches. If successful, prisoners would be taken; if not, casualties would be proof of 
the attempt. Since raids and retaliations could be easily monitored by senior officers, covert 
co-operation between the two sides became impossible. It is no coincidence, Axelrod argues, 
that exactly then the truces broke down. 
 
Is this a case, then, of theoretical work earning its explanatory keep and thus of research 
resources being allocated wisely? That is certainly how it is usually reported, including by 
Axelrod. But, alas, closer inspection shows the opposite. To begin, by Axelrod’s own 
admission some elements of the story deviate from his predictions. The norms of most truces, 
for instance, were not Tit-for-Tat but more like Three-Tits-for-Tat, i.e. typically retaliation 
for the breach of a truce was roughly three times stronger than the original breach. More 
seriously, a vital element to sustaining the truces was the development of what Axelrod terms 
ethics and rituals: local truce norms became ritualized and their observance quickly acquired 
a moral tinge in the eyes of soldiers. This made truces much more robust and is crucial to 
explaining their persistence, as Axelrod concedes. Yet, as Axelrod also concedes, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma says nothing about it. Indeed, he comments (1984, 85) that this emergence of ethics 
is modeled most easily as a change in the players’ payoffs, i.e. as a different game altogether. 
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There are several other important shortfalls in addition to those remarked by Axelrod. First, 
his theory predicts there should be no truce-breaches at all, but in fact breaches were 
common. Second, as a result (and as Axelrod does acknowledge), a series of dampening 
mechanisms therefore had to be developed in order to defuse post-breach cycles of 
retaliation. Again, the Tit-for-Tat analysis is silent about this vital element. Third, it is not 
just that truces had to be robust against continuous minor breaches; the bigger story is that 
often no truces arose at all. Indeed, Ashworth examined regimental and other archives in 
some detail to arrive at the estimate that, overall, there were truces only about one-quarter of 
the time (1980, 171-5). That is, on average, three-quarters of the front was not in a condition 
of live-and-let-live. Prisoner’s Dilemma is silent as to why. Finally, Axelrod’s explanations 
are after-the-fact; there are no novel predictions. Thus, it is difficult to rule out wishful 
rationalization, or that other games might fit the evidence just as well. 
 
There is no mystery, meanwhile, as to what the actual explanations of these various 
phenomena are, for they are given clearly by Ashworth and indeed in many cases are explicit 
in the letters of the original soldiers. Thus, for instance, elite and non-elite units had different 
attitudes and incentives, for various well understood reasons. These in turn led to truces 
occurring overwhelmingly only between non-elite units, again for well understood reasons. 
Why did breaches of truces occur frequently, even before raiding became widespread? 
Ashworth explains via detailed reference to different incentives for different units (artillery 
versus frontline infantry, for instance), and to the fallibility of the mechanisms in place for 
controlling individual hotheads (1980, 153-71). And so on. Removing our Prisoner’s 
Dilemma lens, we see that we have perfectly adequate explanations already. 
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Overall, we cannot reasonably claim that Axelrod’s theoretical analysis explains the WW1 
truces. It is not empirically adequate, it misses crucial elements even in those areas where at 
face value it is empirically adequate, and it is silent on obvious related explananda: not just 
why truces persisted but also why they arose on only a minority of occasions, how they 
originated, and (to some degree) when and why they broke down. Meanwhile, we already 
have an alternative that does explain all of these things – namely, Ashworth’s historical 
account. 
 
This comparative verdict holds true given any plausible theory of explanation or of 
prediction’s relation to explanation. We have no empirical warrant for thinking that 
Prisoner’s Dilemma identified the relevant causes, thus negating claims of causal 
explanation. Deductive-nomological, unification and mathematical accounts of scientific 
explanation similarly require an empirical warrant that is absent in this case. Some recent 
accounts of explanation by models, as we will see below, do put less emphasis on empirical 
warrant. But what matters here is the relative explanatory achievement of Ashworth and 
Axelrod, and given the disparity in empirical success, no plausible account of explanation 
would prefer Axelrod. 
 
But even if it fails to explain, perhaps Prisoner’s Dilemma instead can earn its keep here 
heuristically? Alas, not so. The first reason is that it does not lead us to any explanations that 
we didn’t have already. Ubiquitous quotations in Ashworth show that soldiers were very well 
aware of the basic strategic logic of reciprocity, and of the importance of a credible threat for 
deterring breaches (1980, 150). They were well aware too of why frequent raiding rendered 
truces impossible to sustain, an outcome indeed that many ruefully anticipated even before 
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the policy was implemented (1980, 191-98). In other words, Prisoner’s Dilemma is following 
here, not leading. 
 
The second reason Prisoner’s Dilemma lacks heuristic value is that it actively diverts 
attention away from the aspects that were actually important. I have in mind the crucial 
features mentioned above: how truces originated, the causes and management of the many 
small breaches of them, the importance of ethics and ritualization to their maintenance, why 
truces occurred only in some sections of the front rather than in a majority of them, and so on. 
 
Again, these basic conclusions about the case are robust against differences within the 
philosophical literature over precisely how best to analyze heuristic or other non-explanatory 
virtues, such as understanding. 
 
A common fallback defense here is that at least Prisoner’s Dilemma offers the virtue of 
systematization over mere singular explanation, as befits social science as opposed to history. 
Thus, it is claimed, Prisoner’s Dilemma sheds light on co-operation in general, not just in the 
specific setting of WW1 trench warfare. As it were, global efficiency analysis still favors it 
even if this local one doesn’t. In reply: true enough, models that explain or give heuristic 
value over many different cases are indeed highly desirable and would accordingly be 
endorsed by a global efficiency analysis. But Prisoner’s Dilemma does neither, and 
meanwhile uses up huge resources along the way. As Julian Reiss, Robert Sugden and others 
have argued, the only way to get a reliable sense of what theoretical input is actually useful is 
via detailed empirical investigations, so resources would be better directed towards those 
rather than towards yet more theoretical development. Empirical success in particular cases is 
arguably a necessary condition for usefulness across many (Northcott forthcoming-a). 
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Correctly understanding what actually encouraged co-operation in the WW1 case, for 
instance, is an essential first step if that case is truly to teach us about co-operation in other 
cases too. But Prisoner’s Dilemma directs our attention to the wrong things. 
 
Local efficiency analyses will inevitably be based on case studies. When studying a case in 
detail the efficiency question becomes tractably local and concrete, and the verdict often 
becomes correspondingly clear, so that worries about how exactly to define and weigh up 
explanations, predictions and other virtues become unimportant. In the WW1 case, the 
verdict is that resources put into the theoretical Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis were not well 
spent. They would have been better directed to the history department. 
 
3. The Philosophy of Economics Literature 
There is a standard view about how orthodox economic models are, and should be, used. 
Roughly, no one imagines that any given model will be applicable to every problem; instead, 
economists build up a library of such models, thereby increasing the repertoire available for 
any particular application. All such models obey the same orthodox fundamentals, at least in 
large part. In this way, advocates say, any model is guaranteed to be precise, its conclusions 
to be derived rigorously and to be clearly testable, and above all its analysis to be ‘economic’ 
in the sense of being couched as the result of rational agent choices in the face of incentives. 
Within this orthodox framework, many quite different policy conclusions may be supported; 
the framework itself merely enforces rigor of method, not any particular policy stance 
(Rodrik 2015). 
 
On this view, economic models study the interaction of causal variables in a shielded 
environment. In this respect, they follow the Galilean method standard in natural sciences for 
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centuries. Model application is a judgment of fit between model and target: we should choose 
the model that captures the causes that are actually important in any particular case. A model 
then offers causal explanations, since it shows that a particular effect is to be expected given 
a particular arrangement of causes. Such models are, of course, idealized. But their 
idealizations only hurt when they impede the Galilean project, i.e. when we cannot give the 
model a causal interpretation and use it to intervene successfully. Something like this view is 
endorsed by much influential work in philosophy of economics, for instance that of early 
Cartwright (1989) and Mäki (1992). It is also endorsed (sometimes implicitly) by the 
majority of economists themselves. 
 
This view of economic modeling continues a long tradition stretching back to Mill. He 
argued (1843) that the ever-changing mix of causes in uncontrolled, field cases makes 
accurate prediction a naïve and infeasible goal. Instead, theory should state core causal 
tendencies, such as human agents’ tendency to maximize their wealth. In any particular 
application, we compose relevant tendencies in a deductive way and then add in as necessary 
local ‘disturbing causes’ – i.e. causal factors not captured by theory but that are also present. 
In this way, deductive theory is claimed to be more empirically fruitful than predictive 
alternatives because it offers generalizability – i.e. it offers the prospect of empirical success 
in many applications by adding in different disturbing causes each time. This justifies 
prioritizing modeling orthodoxy over empirical fit – a prioritization that is frequently 
apparent in economic practice (Northcott forthcoming-b; Reiss 2008, 106-22). 
 
There have been many criticisms of this orthodoxy, addressing, among other things, 
idealization, social ontology, and the foundations of rational choice theory (Elster 1988, 
Rosenberg 1992, Lawson 1997, Cartwright 1999). But these criticisms, being general and 
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fundamental in nature, have tended not to distinguish the orthodoxy’s empirical successes 
from its failures. They are not nuanced enough to yield practical advice as to what mix of 
methods will serve economics best going forward. 
 
More recently, much criticism has targeted the view, implied by the orthodoxy, that economic 
models explain. The objection is that, on the contrary, economic models do not explain 
(Northcott and Alexandrova 2013). It is charged that they do not satisfy the usual criteria for 
causal explanation, in particular that their idealizations mean that they do not state true 
causes. Instead, models are taken to play various other roles. One such alternative role is that 
they offer ‘how-possibly’ explanations, i.e. derivations that speak only to possibility in the 
idealized world of the model (Grüne-Yanoff 2009, Aydinonat 2008, Forber 2010). Another is 
that models are useful only heuristically, serving to suggest initial categories or lines of 
enquiry but not themselves earning warrant from empirical success. Instead, that warrant 
accrues to whatever much more narrow-scope causal hypothesis is eventually confirmed 
empirically and which is typically not derivable from the general model (Alexandrova 2008, 
Alexandrova and Northcott 2009, Northcott forthcoming-a). 
 
In response, it has been argued back that the explanatory claims of models can be established 
after all, by means of robustness analysis, i.e. by showing that a model’s derivations are 
robust with respect to variation of some of its assumptions (Kuorikoski et al 2010). 
Moreover, if we understand explanation sufficiently broadly (Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014), 
then it may be that models may still explain even if they are best understood as mere how-
possibly explanations or heuristic aids. 
 
16 
 
But regardless of whether models can indeed explain, that still does not tell us whether to put 
resources into more modeling or instead into other methods. For that, we would need to know 
in addition how often and efficiently models explain – or how often and efficiently they 
perform their non-explanatory role. 
 
Overall, the efficiency question has not so far been a primary focus of philosophy of 
economics. And moreover, what has been the primary focus, such as whether models explain, 
has now reached such an advanced degree of refinement that it no longer has much new to 
say about how research effort in economics should be allocated. The best allocation may 
often, as in the WW1 example, be obvious regardless of our precise preferred theory of 
explanation, in which case further emphasis on the latter will not help with the efficiency 
question. That is the reason for urging a re-focusing of philosophical attention. 
 
4. The Scientific Modeling Literature 
Turn next to the wider scientific modeling literature. In effect, it too has largely neglected the 
efficiency question. 
 
Begin by noting that the modeling literature has been “nearly unanimous in saying that 
models have to be representative in order to give us knowledge” (Knuuttila 2005, 1260). 
Chakravartty (2010, 171) explains why: “a scientific representation is something that 
facilitates practices such as interpretation and inference with respect to its target system … 
how could such practice be facilitated were it not for some sort of similarity between the 
representation and the thing it represents – is it a miracle?” The core idea is that target 
systems are objects in the world with a structure that a model’s structure in some way maps 
onto. Various accounts have been offered of the representation relation between model and 
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target, initially including isomorphism, partial isomorphism and similarity (Frigg 2006). 
(More recently, accounts have become influential that analyze representation in terms of 
practical function or inferential role – see below.) 
 
Across science, many times models clearly are explanatory, and in such cases a focus on 
representation is eminently sensible: successfully representing a cause immediately yields a 
causal explanation, for instance, and successful representation explains empirical success too. 
In non-explanatory cases matters are subtler because the model itself does not explain and it 
might not predict successfully either. On the heuristicist view, for instance, what matters to 
(causal) explanation is instead whether an eventual causal hypothesis represents, not whether 
the initial heuristic model does. Thus, we need assume nothing about any representation 
relation between the initial model and the target.
9
 That does still leave a link between 
representation and explanation, but now in a different place. In the WW1 case, for example, 
Ashworth’s historical explanations succeed precisely because they truly represent actual 
causes. 
 
But the efficiency question concerns something different: is orthodox modeling a good way 
to achieve successful representations? The superiority of Ashworth’s explanations is clear on 
any plausible view of representation, just as it was on any plausible view of explanation. 
Accordingly, at least in the WW1 case, debating the best theory of representation sheds no 
light on the efficiency question, any more than debating the best theory of explanation did. 
What is required instead is a comparison of how well different methodological approaches 
achieve successful representations – in other words, efficiency analysis.  
                                                          
9
 Grüne-Yanoff (2013), working with a how-possibly interpretation of models, argues for a 
similar anti-representation thesis. 
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One virtue of the recent modeling literature is that it allows for failures of representation as 
well as successes, but again that is different from assessing which methods best avoid such 
failures. 
 
Finally, a separate strand of the modeling literature has concerned the relation between 
models and parent theories. Reacting against the close relation posited by the semantic view 
of theories, a rival view has become very influential in the last couple of decades, namely that 
of models as mediators (Morgan and Morrison 1999). Very roughly, this sees models as 
being autonomous from both general theories and particular phenomena. This autonomy 
allows models to act as epistemic tools, facilitating interventions and serving as instruments 
of exploration in their own right. One example is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which is 
distinct both from general economic principles and from particular examples of strategic co-
operation. 
 
There has been some interesting convergence between the mediator and representation 
strands of the literature. In particular, as noted above, more recent accounts of representation 
often define it in practical terms such as inferential role (Suarez 2015). Knuuttila (2011) 
emphasizes models’ role in this regard precisely as epistemic tools. But again, 
notwithstanding the interest of these accounts for other purposes, what matters for efficiency 
analysis is a separate question – namely, which methods produce models that are good 
epistemic tools or good mediators. 
 
5. Conclusion: Global Efficiency Analysis and the Empirical Turn 
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Recently, economics has seen a much remarked ‘empirical turn’. For instance, in the five 
most prestigious journals in economics, the percentage of papers that are purely theoretical – 
i.e. free of any empirical data – fell from 57% in 1983 to 19% in 2011 (Hamermesh 2013). 
Moreover, not only is there more empirical work in prestigious venues but also this empirical 
work is less often theory-based as opposed to ‘a-theoretical’, i.e. it less often tests particular 
theoretical models as opposed to establishing previously untheorized causal relations. Biddle 
and Hamermesh (2016) report that whereas in the 1970s all microeconomic empirical papers 
in top-5 journals exhibited a theoretical framework, in the 2000s there was a resurgence of a-
theoretical studies. Citation numbers suggest that the a-theoretical work is at least as 
influential. Angrist and Pischke (2010) also report the rise of a-theoretical practice in several 
subfields.  
 
One obvious possibility is that the empirical turn has been caused by, in effect, an 
accumulation of global efficiency analyses by practitioners, which have motivated an overall 
shift in research emphasis from pure theory towards empirical application. There is anecdotal 
evidence for this conjecture but as yet no more than that, and we must await more detailed 
work by historians of economics. But the empirical turn is in any case significant here for 
other reasons. Its mere existence shows that theoretical and empirical work are sufficiently 
distinct for it to be meaningful to speak of a shift in resources from one to the other. It also 
shows that the discipline’s norms and incentives are not so entrenched as to make such a shift 
practically impossible. As a result, it now becomes incumbent on philosophers to evaluate 
such shifts – is the empirical turn a good thing? And presumably any such evaluation would 
be precisely some form of global efficiency analysis. 
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Overall, efficiency analyses, both local and global, are inevitable and happening anyway. As 
philosophers of economics we should be assessing them explicitly, as well as carrying out 
such analyses ourselves. We should not be restricting our work just to further examination of 
the epistemic properties of models; instead, let us widen our view to include also the 
organization of the discipline as a whole. In common with economists themselves, I take the 
efficiency question to be of greater practical importance to economics than are the minutiae 
of explanation or representation. It deserves greater attention. 
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